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ABSTRACT 
How does the market react to a government shutdown? Can investors earn above normal 
returns by acting on this type of information? How efficient is the market in reacting to the 
announcement of this type of event?  This event study tests market efficiency theory by analyzing 
the impact of two recent US Government shutdowns on the risk adjusted stock price returns of a 
sample of 50 firms. This study used the standard risk adjusted event study methodology found in 
the finance literature. Evidence confirms the significant and consistent negative reaction of the 
risk adjusted returns for the two 50 firm samples of government contracting firms up to 30 days 
before and after the announcements of the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown.  Evidence here 
documents the tremendous loss of market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal 
Government policy makers to compromise and produce a timely operating budget. 
   
INTRODUCTION 
A government in gridlock that fails to compromise on a budget agreement results in a 
government shutdown which may cause significant damage to the nation’s economy.  If 
Washington policy makers cause a shutdown, the consequences of the failure of the decision 
making process offer important implications for future decision makers.  The enormous costs 
associated with gridlock ought to be measured and weighed in the decision making process. One 
way to quantify the economy’s reaction to a massive government shutdown is to examine how 
the stock market reacts to a government shutdown.  
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Tests for market efficiency can show the effect of a government shutdown on the stock 
market. There are three types of market efficiency: weak-form efficiency, semi-strong-form 
efficiency and strong-form efficiency. These various levels of efficiency have different 
implications for the market’s reaction to an event such as a Federal Government shutdown. 
According to weak-form efficiency, future prices cannot be predicted by analyzing prices from 
the past. Excess returns cannot be earned by using investment strategies based on historical share 
prices or other historical data. Semi-strong-form efficiency is characterized by share prices 
adjusting quickly to publicly available information. The market will respond quickly and will be 
unbiased so that no excess returns can be earned by trading on information in the form of public 
announcements such as a government shutdown. With strong-form efficiency, stock prices 
reflect all information, public and private, and no one can earn excess returns by acting on inside 
information.  
The purpose of this event study was to test market efficiency theory by analyzing the 
impact of the government shutdowns of 1995/1996 and 2013 on two samples of 50 firms each. 
This research tests whether the information embedded in a government shutdown announcement 
exhibits weak or semi-strong market efficiency. This study tests the effects of the government 
shutdowns on the risk adjusted returns of 100 government contracting firms using the standard 
risk adjusted event study methodology in the finance literature. It is reasonable to expect 
government contracting firm to be highly sensitive to a potential federal government shutdown 
since the revenues of these firms depends on a government that is open for business.  If a strong 
and swift correlation exists between the event date or the date of the government shutdown and 
an immediate equity market price change, there may not be opportunity to earn an above normal 
return and evidence would support efficient market theory. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis, stock price returns fully reflect 
all available information. Stock prices react so fast to public information that no investor can 
earn an above normal return by acting on any public announcements, such as the US government 
shutdown; one in 1995 and one in 2013. 
 The US government entered a shutdown October 1, 2013 through October 16, 2013, the 
second longest since 1980 and the most significant measured in terms of employee furlough days 
(Impacts and Costs, 2013). This shutdown most operations of the government after Congress 
failed to reach an agreement on the U.S. Federal budget for the fiscal year of 2014 and President 
Obama’s healthcare bill; this was the first government shutdown in 17 years. During the 
shutdown, approximately 800,000 federal employees were furloughed (Hankel, 2013), for a 
combined total of 6.6 million days (Impacts and Costs, 2013). What happened to the companies 
that relied on government contracts? Did this affect their normal course of business? Was there 
an impact to their stock prices? There was a previous federal government shutdown in 1995-
1996.  
The budget wars in 1995 resulted in the government shutting down for six days, 
November 14-19, and again from December 15, 1995-January 6, 1996 (Kosar, 2004). A dispute 
between President Bill Clinton and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich caused the shutdown. 
They could not agree on domestic spending cuts in the fiscal year 1996 (Drew, 1996). Did both 
of these shutdowns in 1995/96 and 2013 have a similar impact on the stock market?  How fast 
did the market react to both shutdowns? Is the market efficient with respect to a government 
shutdown?  Answers to these questions offer significant implications for policy makers in 
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Washington as they weigh the economic costs associated with gridlock and failure to 
compromise on a budget deal to keep the government open. 
Government shutdowns can cost the Federal government billions of dollars. The payroll 
cost of furloughed employee salaries for the 2013 shutdown was $2.0 billion. The Federal 
government also incurs other costs as a result of a shutdown: fees go uncollected, IRS 
enforcement and other program integrity measures are halted and the Federal government has to 
pay additional interest on payments that are late because of a shutdown (Burwell, 2013). A 
government shutdown has negative effects on the economy. Import and export applications are 
put on hold which can negatively impact trade (Burwell, 2013). Travel and tourism is disrupted 
at national parks and monuments which hurts local economies (Burwell, 2013).  
Not only do government shutdowns impact the financial well-being of the country, they 
also have a negative impact on American citizens. There are Americans who rely on critical 
government programs and services (Kosar, 2004). Patients are unable to enroll in clinical trials at 
the National Institutes of Health, which can make a difference in a patient’s life. Tax refunds are 
delayed and some Americans rely on this money to make yearly payments (Burwell, 2013). 
Finally, government shutdowns can have a long-term impact on the government’s ability to 
retain a skilled workforce. The 2013 shutdown followed a three-year pay freeze for Federal 
employees and cuts in training (Burwell, 2013).  
Fama (1970, 1976) defined market efficiency in three forms: weak-form, semi-strong-
form and strong-form.  Weak-form efficiency deals with the notion that no investor can earn an 
above normal economic return by developing trading rules based on past price or return 
information. If the market is weak form efficient, then stock price reacts so fast to all past 
information that no investor can earn an above normal return (i.e. higher than the risk adjusted 
stock price return) by acting on this type of information. Investors cannot use technical analysis 
of pricing patterns to predict the value of stock prices. The weak from market efficiency test is 
designed to show that successive price returns are random and independent (Kharusi, Sami, & 
Weagley, 2014). For example, if an investor reviews a public quarterly report and buys the firm’s 
stock after discovering the firm had higher than expected earnings for the quarter but the stock 
price does not rise, the market is said to be efficient with respect to past information and is weak 
form efficient. 
According to the semi-strong form efficient market hypothesis concept, the prices of the 
stocks fully reflect all available information and it’s not possible to earn an above normal risk 
adjusted return by acting on this type of information (Ross, 2013). Fama was one of the major 
supporters of the efficient market hypothesis. Semi-strong-form market efficiency states that no 
investor can earn an above normal, economic return based on any publicly available information 
such as accounting statements, stock split announcements, dividend announcements, sale of 
stock announcements, repurchase of stock announcements, block trades, and earnings 
announcements (Semi-Strong Form, 2014).  A federal government shutdown announcement 
would also represent this type of publicly available information relative to market efficiency.   If 
the market is semi-strong form efficient, then stock price reacts so fast to all public information 
that no investor can earn an above normal return by acting on this type of information. The 
investors cannot use technical analysis or fundamental analysis to find the value of stocks 
(Kharusi, Sami, & Weagley, 2014). Public announcements of a government shutdown, stock 
splits, repurchases, and dividend increases are examples of public information. If an investor 
trades the stock on the announcement date and still does not make an above normal return, the 
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market is semi-strong form efficient.  This study examines semi-strong efficiency with respect to 
the announcement of a federal government shutdown.   
Strong-form efficiency theory suggests that no investor can earn an above normal, 
economic return using any information, public or private.  If the market is strong form efficient, 
then stock prices react so fast to all information (public and private) that no investor can earn an 
above normal return by acting on this type of information.  In this case, the market reacts to an 
event within the confines of the firm when it occurs even before it is publicly announced. For 
this to occur, investors must act on insider information, which is illegal.  If an investor trades the 
stock on the event based on inside information, and still does not make an above normal return, 
the market is strong form efficient. 
Since information effects prices immediately, investors should only expect to obtain a 
normal rate of return.  However, does market efficiency hold for public announcements of a 
government shutdown?  Weak form efficiency states that a company’s stock price is based on 
past prices and information, while strong form efficiency argues that the price is a reflection of 
all information, public and private.  While both of these theories have merit, this study asserts 
that government shutdown announcements are reflected in the price of a company’s stock 
according to the semi-strong form of efficiency, indicating that all public information available 
determines the price of the stock.     
METHODOLGY 
This research study analyzed the risk adjusted rate of return for a sample of 50 firms 
before and after the 2 government shutdowns in 1995/96 and 2013 to test the semi-strong form 
efficient market hypothesis. Samples were randomly selected from government contracting 
firms. 36 firms from the first shutdown remained in the second shutdown. This study used the 
standard risk adjusted event study methodology found in the finance literature. The event day 
(day 0) is the date of the government shutdown announcement, which is November 14 for 1995 
and October 1 for 2013. The historical financial data was obtained through Yahoo Finance and 
analyzed as follows.  
1. The historical stock prices of the sample companies and S&P 500, for the event study 
duration of -180 to +30 days (where day -30 to +30 is the event period and day 0 is the event 
day) were obtained. 
2. The holding period returns (R) for the sample firms and the corresponding S&P 500 
index (Rm) for each day in this study were calculated using the following formula: 
Current daily return = (current day close price – previous day close price) 
     Previous day close price 
3. A regression analysis was performed using the actual daily return of each company 
(dependent variable) and the corresponding S&P 500 daily return (independent variable) over the 
pre-event period (day -180 to -31) to obtain the intercept alpha and beta.  The firms’ alphas and 
betas are shown in Tables 1 and 2 for the 1995and 2013 shutdowns, respectively.  
Risk-Adjusted Method (Market Model) 
Ri,t = a + bRm,t + e parameter estimation during pre-event period 
E(R) = a + bRm                           for each day during event period 
Excess Return = Actual Return – (a + bRm) 
 
 
5 
 
Table 1: ALPHAS AND BETAS FOR 1995 GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN  
Firm Name Ticker Alpha Beta 
Lockheed Martin LMT 0.00089706 1.16907402 
Northrop Grumman NOC 0.00138441 0.71002098 
Verizon VZ -0.00014 1.100214 
Raytheon RTN 0.000723 0.542108 
Hewlett-Packard HPQ 0.000587 1.685688 
Computer Sciences Corporation CSC 0.000406 1.265531 
Jacobs Engineering Group JEC 0.000448 0.667897 
Boeing BA 0.000777 1.378171 
General Dynamics Corporation GD 9.58E-05 0.868757 
Harris Corporation HRS 0.000411 0.892525 
CACI International CACI 0.000998 1.279062 
IBM IBM 0.0004 1.122684 
United Technologies UTX 0.000956 0.732155 
B/E Aerospace Inc. BEAV 0.00319 0.139499 
Celadon Group CGI -0.00122 0.147218 
Honeywell International HON -0.00023 0.962829 
AT&T T 0.000672 1.176627 
Alliant Techsystems ATK 0.001084 0.311155 
Unisys Corp UIS -0.00195 0.860372 
General Electric GE -0.00026 1.243325 
Century Link CTL -0.00037 0.332293 
RTI International RTI 0.005413 0.254906 
Xerox Corporation XRX -0.00031 1.347202 
Ball Corporation BLL -0.00138 0.806172 
Cubic Corporation CUB 0.000479 0.832415 
Oshkosh Corporation OSK 0.00116 0.646395 
McKesson Corporation MCK 0.000797 0.647378 
URS Corporation URS -4.4E-05 0.683847 
Humana Inc. HUM -0.00214 1.205183 
Healthnet Inc. HNT 0.000492 1.144353 
Textron TXT 0.000587 0.807666 
Navistar International NAV -0.00236 1.09509 
Merck & Co. Inc MRK 0.001617 0.583926 
Pfizer Inc. PFE 0.001745 0.317451 
Cardinal Health CAH 0.000765 0.133139 
Tetratech TTEK 0.002904 -0.02411 
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM 0.000322 0.568414 
Valero Energy Corporation VLO 0.001639 0.364462 
Ciber CBR 0.000955 1.925333 
GlaxoSmithKline plc GSK 0.000969 0.480373 
AstraZeneca plc AZN 0.001904 0.318683 
Methode Electronics MEI 0.001438 1.320291 
Dominion Resources  D -0.00029 0.531802 
Praxair PX -0.00011 0.988635 
Pepco Holdings POM 0.001253 0.602678 
GenCorp GY -0.00152 0.190938 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 0.000929 0.820479 
Koninklijke Philips PHG 0.001664 0.779294 
Medtronic Inc. MDT 0.002613 1.04057 
Boston Scientific Corp BSX 0.002397 1.758926 
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Table 2: ALPHAS AND BETAS FOR 2013 GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 
Firm Name Ticker Alpha Beta 
Lockheed Martin LMT 0.00132418 0.79831544 
Northrop Grumman NOC 0.00175598 0.79325727 
Verizon VZ 0.00043 0.641845 
Raytheon RTN 0.001474 0.71652 
Hewlett-Packard HPQ 0.002632 0.878972 
Computer Science Group CSC 0.000498 1.361739 
Jacobs Engineering Group JEC 0.001012 1.460351 
Boeing BA 0.001463 0.916067 
General Dynamics Corporation GD 0.000627 0.880267 
Harris Corporation HRS 0.000402 0.996649 
CACI International CACI 0.000583 0.973898 
IBM IBM -0.00073 0.762279 
United Technologies UTX 0.000557 1.023362 
B/E Aerospace Inc. BEAV 0.00125 1.26577 
Celadon Group CGI -0.00145 1.382945 
Honeywell International HON 0.000577 1.172603 
AT&T T -0.00039 0.71175 
Alliant Techsystems ATK 0.002233 0.856703 
Unisys Corp UIS 0.001625 1.31539 
General Electric GE 0.000244 0.943636 
Century Link CTL -0.00152 0.778948 
RTI International RTI -0.00041 1.490997 
Xerox Corporation XRX 0.001263 1.352813 
Ball Corporation BLL -0.00062 0.908086 
Cubic Corporation CUB -8.2E-05 0.947262 
Oshkosh Corporation OSK 0.001109 1.921241 
McKesson Corporation MCK 0.00069 0.785438 
URS Corporation URS 0.000659 1.083178 
Humana Inc. HUM 0.001691 0.345725 
Healthnet Inc. HNT -1.2E-07 1.026708 
Textron TXT -0.00103 1.848564 
Navistar International NAV 0.000877 2.508768 
Merck & Co. Inc MRK 0.000268 0.701658 
Pfizer Inc. PFE 1.88E-05 0.80349 
Cardinal Health CAH 0.000623 0.848268 
Tetratech TTEK -0.00222 1.163991 
Booz Allen Hamilton BAH 0.002182 0.775281 
KBR Inc. KBR -0.00052 1.453227 
Fluor Corp. FLR -0.00078 1.694448 
L3 Communications Holding LLL 0.000631 0.807102 
ITT Corporation IT 0.001006 1.471509 
Rockwell Collins COL 0.000664 0.98289 
AmerisourceBergen Corp ABC 0.001326 0.613073 
Babcock & Wilcox Company BWC 0.000421 0.932074 
CGI Group GIB -0.00145 1.382945 
Accenture plc ACN -0.00051 1.096228 
VSE Corp VSEC 0.003737 0.736176 
United Parcel Service UPS 0.000142 0.770687 
AECOM Technology Corp ACM -6.7E-06 1.748248 
Southcross Energy Partners SXE -0.00114 0.221362 
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4. In order to get the normal expected returns, the risk-adjusted method was used. The 
expected return for each stock, for each day of the event period from day -30 to +30 was 
calculated as follows: 
E(R) = alpha + beta * (Rm) 
5. Excess return (ER) was calculated as follows:  
ER = the Actual Return (R) – Expected Return E(R) 
6. Average Excess Returns (AER) were calculated (for each day from -30 to +30) by 
averaging the excess returns for all the firms for each day.  
AER = Sum of Excess Return for sample firms on each day  
   N 
7. Cumulative AER (CAER) was calculated by adding the AERs for each day from -30 to 
+30. 
8. Graphs of AER and Cumulative AER were plotted for the event period.  
 
To test for semi-strong market efficiency on the government shutdown announcements, 
the following null and alternative hypotheses were used for the two shutdown samples: 
H10:  The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement 
date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown. 
H11: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected by this type of information on the 
announcement date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown. 
H20:  The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information around the 
announcement date of the November 14, 1995 government shutdown as defined by the event 
period. 
H21:   The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected around the announcement date of the 
November 14, 1995 government shutdown as defined by the event period. 
H30:  The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the announcement 
date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown. 
H31: The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected by this type of information on the 
announcement date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown. 
H40:  The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information around the 
announcement date of the October 1, 2013 government shutdown as defined by the event period. 
H41:   The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms is significantly negatively affected around the announcement date of the 
October 1, 2013 government shutdown as defined by the event period. 
H50:   The reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 
government contracting firms for the 1995/96 government shutdown is not significantly different 
from the reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms for the 2013 government shutdown around the announcement date as defined 
by the event period. 
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H51:  The reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 
government contracting firms for the 1995/96 government shutdown is significantly different 
from the reaction of risk adjusted return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government 
contracting firms for the 2013 government shutdown around the announcement date as defined 
by the event period. 
QUANTITATIVE TESTS AND RESULTS 
Did the market react to the government shutdown announcements in 1995 and 2013?  
Was the information surrounding the event significant? A’priori, one would expect there to be a 
significant difference in the Actual Average Daily Returns (Day -30 to Day +30) and the 
Expected Average Daily Returns (Day -30 to Day +30) if the information surrounding the event 
impounds new, significant information on the market price of the sample firms' stock.  If a 
significant risk adjusted difference is observed, then we support our hypothesis that this type of 
information did in fact significantly either increase or decrease stock price.  To statistically test 
for a difference in the Actual Daily Average Returns and the Expected Daily Average Returns 
over the event period day -30 to day +30, we conducted a paired sample t-test for the two 
samples and found a significant difference at the 5% level between actual average daily returns 
and the risk adjusted expected average daily returns.  Average Excess Return (AER) graphs are 
shown on pages 9 and 10.  Results here support the alternate hypothesis H21 and H41:   The risk 
adjusted return of the stock price of the two samples (50 firms each) of government contracting 
firms is significantly negatively affected around the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown dates 
as defined by the event periods.  This finding supports the significance of the information around 
the event since the market’s negative reaction was observed. 
Is it possible to isolate and observe the samples’ daily response to the announcement 
from day -30 to day +30?  If so, at what level of efficiency did the market respond to the 
information and what are the implications for market efficiency?  Another purpose of this 
analysis was to test the efficiency of the market in reacting to the government shutdown 
announcements.  Specifically, do we observe weak, semi-strong, or strong form market 
efficiency as defined by Fama, 1970, in the efficient market hypothesis? The key in the analysis 
is to determine if the AER and CAER are significantly different from zero or that there is a 
visible graphical or statistical relationship between time and either AER or CAER.  T-tests of 
AER and CAER both tested different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  Likewise, 
observation of the CAER Graphs in Charts 2 and 4 (graphs of CAER from day –30 to day +30 
for the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown samples, respectively) on pages 10 and 11 confirms 
the significant and consistent negative reaction of the risk adjusted returns for the two samples of 
government contracting firms up to 30 prior to the announcements of the 1995 and 2013 
government shutdowns. Graphs in Charts 2 and 4 demonstrate that the announcements of  the 
1995 and 2013 government shutdown had a significant negative impact on the firms’ share price 
up to 30 days prior to announcement day 0 with a continuous negative trend up to 30 following 
day 0. The evidence supports the null hypotheses H10 and H30:  The risk adjusted return of the 
stock price of the 2 samples of 50 government contracting firms is not significantly affected by 
this type of information on the announcement dates of the November 14, 1995 and the October 1, 
2013 government shutdowns.  The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the two samples of 
government contracting firms is not significantly affected by this type of information on the 
announcement date when made public.  
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 For the samples of firms analyzed, an investor is unable to earn an above normal risk 
adjusted return by acting on the public announcements of the government shutdowns.  As of the 
announcement date, the firms’ stock prices had already adjusted to the new information 
embedded in the government shutdown.  However, after the announcement, stock price exhibited 
a continuous negative trend up to 30 days post announcement suggesting that an investor could 
earn an above normal return following the government shutdown announcement. Such post 
announcement stock returns behavior offers support for the weak form of market efficiency. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis which 
states that the stock price reflects all publicly available information on the announcement but the 
post announcement negative trend of the risk adjusted stock returns is consistent with weak form 
market efficiency hypothesis.  Interestingly, the results for both samples suggest significant 
trading activity up to 30 days prior to the announcement of the government shutdowns, possibly 
suggesting that investors may have anticipated the events.  
In addition, the study analyzed whether or not market efficiency varies by timing of the 
government shutdowns.  Specifically, are the observed reactions to the 1995 and 2013 shutdowns 
similar?  Observation and comparison of the CAER graphs in Chart 2 and 4 below show similar 
reaction to the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown announcements.  Specifically CAER graphs 
in Chart 2 and 4 below show a continuous negative trend in risk adjusted stock returns from day -
30 to day +30.   The negative reaction to the 1995 shutdown appears to be slightly larger and 
more volatile than in 2013.   While there are minor observable differences in the two samples’ 
reaction to the shutdown news, overall the results support H50.   The reaction of risk adjusted 
return of the stock price of the sample of 50 government contracting firms for the 1995/96 
government shutdown is not significantly different from the reaction of risk adjusted return of 
the stock price of the sample of 50 government contracting firms for the 2013 government 
shutdown around the announcement date as defined by the event period.  Evidence here 
documents the tremendous loss of market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal 
Government policy makers to compromise and produce a timely operating budget. 
 
Chart 1: AER vs. Time 1995 Government Shutdown 
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Chart 2: CAER vs. Time 1995 Government Shutdown 
 
 
 
Chart 3: AER vs. Time 2013 Government Shutdown 
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Chart 4: CAER vs. Time 2013 Government Shutdown 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this event study was to test market efficiency theory by analyzing the 
impact of the government shutdowns of 1995/1996 and 2013 on two samples of 50 firms each. 
This research tests whether the information embedded in government shutdown announcement 
exhibits semi-strong market efficiency. The risk adjusted return of the stock price of the two 
samples (50 firms each) of government contracting firms is significantly negatively affected 
around the 1995 and 2013 government shutdown dates as defined by the event periods.  This 
finding supports the significance of the information around the event since the market’s negative 
reaction was observed. 
Evidence confirms the significant and consistent negative reaction of the risk adjusted 
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1995 and 2013 government shutdown had a significant negative impact on the firm’s share price 
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announcement suggesting that an investor could earn an above normal return following the 
government shutdown announcement. Such post announcement stock returns behavior offers 
support for the weak form of market efficiency. Results are mixed with support of the semi-
strong form market efficiency hypothesis stating that stock price reflects all publicly available 
information on the announcement but the post announcement negative trend of the risk adjusted 
stock returns is consistent with weak form market efficiency hypothesis.  Interestingly, the 
results for both samples suggest significant trading activity up to 30 days prior to the 
announcement of the government shutdowns possibly suggesting that investors may have 
anticipated the events.  
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In comparing the 1995 and 2013 reactions, there are minor observable differences in the 
two samples’ reaction to the shutdown news.   Evidence here documents the tremendous loss of 
market capital in reaction to a failure of the Federal Government policy makers to compromise 
and produce a timely operating budget.  An important extension of the current study could 
conduct the same tests on the announcement of the government’s reopening to investigate the 
possible gain in the capital markets relative to the positive news.   
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